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FOREWORD
In this, our third issue of Volume 22, the Review presents three Articles. The first, by San Francisco attorney Kingsley R. Browne, examines
the constitutional and statutory legality of comparable worth plans based
on sex classifications. These plans attempt to achieve equal compensation levels between female-dominated jobs and different, male-dominated
jobs where the jobs require comparable levels of worker skill, effort and
responsibility. The author argues that these sex-based plans, as species of
sexual discrimination in employment, must satisfy the affirmative action
standards of the equal protection clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. After examining Supreme Court pronouncements on affirmative action, Mr. Browne concludes that the plans are constitutionally and statutorily infirm. The author asserts that employers could
achieve job parity equally well by implementing sex-neutral comparable
worth plans.
Our second Article explores the ever-expanding scope of liability for
negligent misrepresentation. Professor Deborah A. Ballam predicts that
courts will soon impose liability for the tort upon certain publishers who
negligently print erroneous objective data when they know or should
know that investors and creditors may rely on the data in making business decisions. The author arrives at her prediction by drawing an analogy between these publishers and accountants who have been held liable
for negligently certifying erroneous financial information. Professor Ballam also analyzes the role that the first amendment's free-press clause
may play in judicial analyses of publisher negligent misrepresentation.
The author of our third Article, practitioner Paul J. Nadel, reviews
the development and current status of the California real estate law doctrine of vested rights. During the current "slow-growth" era, landowners and developers have been forced to halt or modify projects in
progress to comply with land use restrictions imposed by regulators after
work has commenced. Local governments retain authority to modify,
control or disapprove a proposed development until the developer acquires a "vested right" to complete a project. The author demonstrates
that the common-law vested rights rule is inadequate to assure that a
developer will not be barred from completing a project as planned. Mr.
Nadel explains how developers can obtain enhanced protection under
two recently enacted statutes: the Development Agreement legislation of
1979 and the Vesting Tentative Map legislation of 1984. Finally, the au-
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thor instructs how developers can challenge the effects of subsequently
enacted land use regulations through the law of inverse condemnation.
We are also pleased to present three student-written pieces in this
issue of the Review. Staff writer Stephen A. Meister examines the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the "outrageous government conduct" defense in federal criminal prosecutions.
The defense is asserted when conduct by law enforcement officials has
been so egregious that it rises to the level of a due process violation. The
author traces the development of the defense in Supreme Court cases and
its application in the Ninth Circuit. He argues that the court of appeals
has formulated an unwarrantedly narrow interpretation of the defense,
which has effectively extinguished its use in the circuit. In conclusion,
the author propounds guidelines for consideration by the court in future
cases and proposes remedial congressional legislation to codify the
defense.
Staff writer Brian S. Kabateck considers commercial speech and attorney advertising in his Note on Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association.
In Shapero, the Supreme Court of the United States held that state regulators may not absolutely ban attorneys from soliciting clients through
direct-target mailings. The Note analyzes Shapero against the historical
development of the commercial speech doctrine which culminated in the
four-part commercial speech test of CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission. The author contends that the Shapero
Court misapplied the CentralHudson test, thereby diluting its usefulness
as a guidepost for regulators who formulate rules governing attorney advertising. The author concludes by proposing specific regulations addressing direct-target mail solicitation that are consistent with both
Shapero and CentralHudson.
In the final contribution to this issue, Articles Editor Patricia Y.
Synn analyzes the reasoning and implications of another Supreme Court
decision, Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission. In Nollan, the Court
held that governments may impose a condition on the granting of land
use permits only when the condition bears an "essential nexus" with the
state's purpose in conditioning the permit; imposing a condition unrelated to the state's purpose constitutes a taking of property demanding
just compensation. The author posits that Nollan could be interpreted
two different ways, leading to stunningly divergent results. Under the
broader reading, all land use regulations must satisfy the essential-nexus
test, with the regulation substantially advancing the state's interest in
promulgating it. The narrower reading holds that the nexus should be
required only in cases where the state seeks to impose by condition what
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it could not impose outright without resorting to its eminent-domain
power and payment of just compensation. The author urges that courts
adopt the narrower reading. This would ensure both that governments
retain the necessary latitude to impose important land use regulations
and that landowners are protected from thinly disguised governmental
takings.
The Editors

